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Abstract 
After briefly reviewing the history of dual-process theories in cognitive and social psychology, 
this chapter explores implications of the dual-process perspective for Buddhist contemplative 
practices, including mindfulness.  On the one hand, the impulsive and habitual processes in 
dual-process theories offer a natural account of the phenomena that contemplative practices 
address (e.g., craving, negative emotion, self-interest, mind wandering).  On the other hand, 
the regulatory and reflective processes in dual-process theories offer insightful perspective 
into how contemplative practices modulate these phenomena.  Additionally, dual-process 
theories offer useful accounts of the constant interplay between habitual and regulatory 
processing in everyday life, and how contemplative practices establish healthy new cognitive, 
affective, and behavioral habits that replace less healthy well-entrenched ones.  In turn, 
contemplative practices—especially the collection of Buddhist practices known as the Eight-
Fold Path—provide insight into the nature of habitual processing, and offer provocative ideas 
for developing interventions to change it. 
 
 
 
Dual-Process Theories 
From the dual-process perspective, 
psychological phenomena typically include:  (1) 
Impulsive and habitual processes that are relatively 
involuntary, implicit, and unconscious, often 
associated with hedonic short-term goals, requiring 
few executive resources; (2) Regulatory and 
reflective processes that are relatively voluntary, 
explicit, and conscious, often associated with 
rational long-term goals, requiring significant use of 
executive resources.  For any given psychological 
phenomenon, the basic idea is that initial processing 
results from the first type of process, with the second 
type of process available optionally to regulate it. 
Dual-process theories have played central 
roles in explaining cognitive, social, affective, and 
appetitive phenomena for decades.  At least since 
James (1890/1950), cognitive psychologists have 
incorporated the dual-process framework 
extensively into their theory and research (e.g., 
Evans, 1984; Posner and Snyder, 1975; Schneider 
& Shiffrin, 1977; Sloman, 1996).  Social 
psychologists have similarly incorporated the dual-
process framework extensively into their work 
(e.g., Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Metcalfe & Mischel, 
1999; Sherman, Garwonski, & Trope, 2014; Strack 
& Deutsch, 2004).  In a major review of dual-
process theories, Stanovich and West (2000) 
dubbed the two processes of dual-process theories 
“System 1” and “System 2.”  Given the ubiquity of 
these two kinds of processes across human 
behavior, they are likely to be important in 
contemplative practices as well. 
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A fundamental assumption of many dual-
process theories is that System 1 causes the lion’s 
share of behavior, emotion, and thought.  From this 
perspective, daily experience in the world 
conditions the associative structures in memory that 
produce actions, bodily states, and cognitive 
processing.  Furthermore, System 2 has relatively 
little control over behavior, emotion, and thought 
(e.g., Goschke, 2013), while creating intuitive 
theories about oneself and the world via language, 
social interaction, and culture that are at often 
limited and incorrect (e.g., Wilson, 2004). 
Significant implications for measurement 
follow from dual-process assumptions about 
behavioral causes and intuitive theories (e.g., 
Gawronski & Payne, 2011; Greenwald & Banaji, 
1995).  In psychological research, it has become 
widely accepted that explicit self-report measures 
are unlikely to measure the causal mechanisms of 
interest in System 1 accurately.  Because people 
typically have little conscious access to the System 
1 mechanisms that cause their behavior, emotion, 
and thought, they have little ability to know and 
describe these mechanisms accurately.  Instead, 
self-report measures are much more likely to 
capture people’s intuitive theories about these 
causes in System 2.  To accurately measure the 
mechanisms in System 1 requires the use of implicit 
measures that target System 1 mechanisms 
indirectly without people’s awareness. 
Thus, from the dual-process perspective, 
System 1 constitutes a huge system of conditioned 
mechanisms that operate largely unconsciously, 
often producing behavior, emotion, and thought 
outside deliberate control, in relatively automatic 
and habitual manners.  Because it often feels as if 
an out-of-control beast occupies our brain and runs 
our life, System 1 is sometimes referred to 
metaphorically as a 10,000 pound gorilla.  
Nevertheless System 2 offers significant resources 
for regulating System 1’s activity.  Once System 1 
begins to produce an action, for example, System 2 
can inhibit it or replace it with another action.  In 
humans, the executive system underlies the ability 
to self-regulate, capitalizing on significantly 
expanded frontal and associative systems in the 
brain (e.g., Berger, 2011; Buckner & Krienen, 
2013; Goschke, 2013; Hofmann, Schmeichel, & 
Baddeley, 2012; Mischel et al., 2011).  Besides 
regulating behavior, emotion, and thought in the 
current moment, regulatory processes can attempt 
to implement long-term changes well into the 
future (e.g., (Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2014; 
Wilson, 2011). 
Challenges to Dual-Process Theories 
Much theory and research make it clear that 
reifying Systems 1 and 2 into two distinct systems 
is unjustified (e.g., Moors & De Houwer, 2006; 
Sharma, Markon, & Clark, 2014; Stahl et al., 2014; 
also see relevant chapters in Sherman et al., 2014).  
One problem is that processes associated with 
System 1 are highly diverse, as are processes 
associated with System 2, suggesting that neither 
kind of process originates in a fixed system.  
Conversely, processes associated with System 1 
often share properties with processes associated 
with System 2, further suggesting that the two 
kinds of processes don’t originate in different rigid 
systems. 
A much more plausible approach is to simply 
assume that brain architecture in humans has 
evolved to produce what I will call Involuntary 
Initial Responses (IRs) and Optional Regulatory 
Responses (RRs).1  IRs reflect the basic neural 
architecture of ascending pathways in modality-
specific systems.  As a stimulus is perceived (e.g., 
in vision, audition, taste), its sensory and perceptual 
features are processed early in these pathways, 
followed by conceptual processing later.  During 
conceptual processing, multimodal patterns may be 
accessed that produce inferences about the 
stimulus, including its value for the perceiver and 
actions that the perceiver could perform on it. 
Because most stimuli have become conditioned in 
this manner, perceiving just about anything in the 
environment is likely to produce some kind of IR.2 
Conversely, RRs reflect the ability to regulate IRs 
using diverse meta-cognitive and regulatory abilities.  
Because the human brain has been endowed with large 
association areas and frontal lobes, humans can regulate 
their responses to stimuli in a flexible manner.  Although 
IRs occur constantly, humans have the ability to monitor 
these responses, evaluate them, and then inhibit, change, 
or protect them. 
Implications of Dual-Process Theories  
for Contemplative Practices 
The dual-process perspective fits naturally with 
contemplative approaches.  Given how broadly the 
dual-process perspective applies to cognitive and 
social phenomena, it’s not surprising that it applies to 
contemplative approaches, too.  Here, I focus on 
Buddhism, because mindfulness—the focus of this 
edited volume—plays such a central role in it.   I also 
focus on Buddhism because it’s the only 
contemplative approach that I know anything about 
(in particular, Tibetan Buddhism).  Because I’m far 
from an expert, however, my discussions of 
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Buddhism should be viewed as simply attempting to 
offer a general and relatively superficial account of 
how the dual-process perspective can be brought to 
bear on contemplative practices. 
First consider The Four Noble Truths that lie at 
the core of Buddhism (e.g., Gethin, 2010), 
described here from the Western perspective.  
According to the First Noble Truth, life contains 
considerable suffering, which not only includes 
physical suffering, such as hardship, disease, and 
loss, but also extensive psychological suffering, 
related to grasping and aversion (e.g., stress, 
negative emotion, dissatisfaction).  According to the 
Second Noble Truth, one important source of 
psychological suffering is the conditioning of a 
person’s cognitive system, which produces constant 
grasping and aversion.  For example, frequently 
craving sweets, eating too many, and feeling guilty 
about consuming them results from years of 
conditioning that produce appetitive desires for 
sweets in general, inability to regulate their 
consumption, and dysfunctional emotional sequelae.  
According to the Third Noble Truth, reducing the 
psychological suffering that one experiences is 
possible.  By changing the conditioning that causes 
suffering, a happier and healthier life can result.  
According to the Fourth Noble Truth, various 
practices and strategies exist for changing one’s 
conditioning, which take advantage of the inherent 
flexibility and potential for change in human nature.  
Intentionally becoming mindful of impulses to 
consume sweets, for example, and learning to watch 
these impulses dissipate without acting on them can 
lead to improvements in physical and psychological 
well being. 
From the dual-process perspective, the First 
and Second Noble Truths bear on the conditioning 
responsible for behavior, emotion, and thought, 
whereas the Third and Fourth Noble Truths bear on 
the potential for acquiring strategies that regulate 
and change this conditioning.  As we will see later, 
the Fourth Noble Truth is associated with the Eight-
Fold Path, which is a sophisticated collection of 
regulatory strategies capable of transforming every 
aspect of a person’s life, including their cognition, 
affect, ethics, actions, self, and subjective 
experience. 
The fundamental principle of karma in Buddhism 
offers a related example.  According to this principle, a 
person’s intentions and actions condition their 
character, habits, and subjective experience (e.g., 
Gethin, 2010).  Because karma reflects all the 
conditioning that a person has accumulated over a life 
time (and over previous life times if one accepts 
reincarnation), it is the 10,000 pound gorilla that 
dominates behavior, emotion, and thought via IRs.  The 
construct of karma fits quite comfortably with the dual-
process assumption that conditioning governs people’s 
existence.  Within this conditioning, a wide variety 
RRs may also be available, such as adopting 
contemplative (and other regulatory) practices that 
change one’s conditioning for the better. 
IRs in Contemplative Practices 
As we just saw, the Four Noble Truths state 
that a person’s conditioning is responsible for their 
suffering.  Buddhism offers many further proposals 
on the nature of suffering, describing in some detail 
the conditioning that makes people unhappy.   In 
general, people suffer because they live in samsara, 
the psychological world of illusion and 
dissatisfaction.  As they experience entities and 
events in their daily activities, they react to them 
cognitively and emotionally in ways that throw 
them off balance, such that they do not experience 
happiness (e..g, Ricard, 2007). 
From the dual-process perspective, these non-
optimal reactions can be viewed as the 
consequences of IRs.  As entities and events are 
encountered in the world, they activate IRs via past 
conditioning that produce imbalance and 
unhappiness, often in relatively subtle ways.  
Although IRs serve a wide variety of useful goals 
in daily life, they may not necessarily lead to 
balance and happiness.  On seeing a tasty food, for 
example, the IRs that cause people to approach and 
consume it ensure that they won’t starve.  The 
downside, though, is that these IRs also cause 
desire and craving, which make people dissatisfied, 
wanting things they don’t currently have.  
Furthermore, these desires and craving, if acted on 
inappropriately, can eventually lead to outcomes 
that make people unhappy and unhealthy, such as 
becoming overweight or diabetic. 
According to Buddhism, several important types 
of IRs underlie dissatisfaction and unhappiness:  
grasping and aversion, the illusion of self, negative 
emotion, and mind wandering.  The following sub-
sections address each in turn.  A final subsection 
further notes that RRs have the potential to 
exacerbate the problems that IRs initiate (before 
turning in the final section to how RRs can instead 
ameliorate these problems). 
Grasping and aversion.  Many traditions of 
Buddhism assume that several root causes underlie 
people’s dissatisfaction and unhappiness, 
permeating the conditioning that controls their 
behavior (e.g., Bodhi, 2005; Gethin, 2010).  Two of 
these root causes are grasping and aversion.  
Whereas grasping is the desire to possess 
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something, aversion is the desire to avoid 
something.  In each case, a desire emerges for 
something other than the current state-of-affairs.  
Most importantly, the current moment is viewed as 
lacking in some way, creating an imbalance that 
leads to dissatisfaction and unhappiness (e.g., 
Gethin, 2010; Loy, 2002).  The extensive suffering 
and samsara that people experience, as noted in the 
Four Noble Truths, results from this lack and 
imbalance that they experience constantly in their 
lives.  As people continually grasp at some things 
and attempt to avoid others, they create a perpetual 
sense of unease and are never truly happy. 
From the dual-process perspective, the constant 
grasping and aversion that people experience can be 
viewed as resulting from the constant activation of 
IRs.  As entities and events are encountered in the 
world (or imagined in thought), they trigger IRs that 
produce tendencies to approach them (grasping) or to 
avoid them (aversion).  In the terms of Western 
science, grasping leads to approach behavior 
associated with positive valence, whereas aversion 
leads to avoidance behavior associated with negative 
valence.  In this way, the Buddhist constructs of 
grasping and aversion map naturally onto the central 
scientific constructs of approach and avoidance, and 
also onto those for positive and negative valence (cf. 
Barrett & Bliss‐Moreau, 2009). 
Extensive scientific research demonstrates that 
entities and events generally activate a wide variety 
of valenced responses.  The evaluative priming task 
in social psychology, for example, demonstrates that 
words and pictures often produce evaluative 
responses as IRs, some positive and some negative 
(for a review, see Herring et al., 2013).  Typically, 
evaluative priming research focuses on words and 
pictures that produce strong evaluative responses 
(e.g., baby, robbery).  Arguably, however, there is no 
such thing as a completely neutral response to 
anything (e.g., sparrow, television; Lebrecht, Bar, 
Barrett, & Tarr, 2012).  In general, these widespread 
evaluative responses can be viewed as tendencies to 
approach and avoid the respective stimuli, or in 
Buddhist terms, as tendencies for grasping and 
aversion. 
Increasing neuroscience research similarly 
demonstrates that perceiving stimuli activates brain 
areas quickly that produce evaluations, especially 
the orbital-frontal cortex (OFC).  When viewing 
visual objects briefly, for example, not only does 
visual processing of the object occur, so does rapid 
evaluative processing (e.g., Chaumon, Kveraga, 
Barrett, & Bar, 2014; Lebrecht et al., 2012; 
Shenhav, Barrett, & Bar, 2012).  Within much less 
than a second of viewing an object, the brain 
produces an evaluation of it, often unconsciously 
(e.g., Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2001; 
Winkielman, Berridge, & Wilbarger, 2005).  As 
large literatures show, evaluative responses are 
produced to just about everything, with different 
domains of evaluative responses residing in 
domain-specific areas of OFC (Rudebeck & 
Murray, 2014; Wilson, Takahashi, Schoenbaum, & 
Niv, 2014). 
Thus, the Buddhist proposal that grasping and 
avoidance lie at the heart of human conditioning 
finds strong support from both behavioral and 
neuroscience research.  One of the most basic 
things that people do is to evaluate whether the 
entities and events they encounter are good or bad, 
and whether they should approach or avoid them. 
Finally, the strong impulses and desires that 
people often experience can be highly disruptive to 
mental, physical, and social well-being.  Because 
these particular IRs are especially intense and 
compelling, they may often have the most potent 
motivational effects on ensuing behavior (e.g., 
Papies & Barsalou, 2015; Papies, Pronk, Keesman, 
& Barsalou, 2015).  For this reason, developing 
good regulatory strategies, such as mindfulness, 
may be especially important for managing impulses 
and desires.  To the extent that intense IRs can arise 
and dissipate without affecting behavior, they 
become less likely to produce problems, such that 
greater control and choice emerge. 
The illusion of self.   As described in the 
previous section, Buddhism assumes that several 
root causes lie at the heart of people’s conditioning, 
with two of these being grasping and aversion.  The 
most important root cause, however, is the illusion 
of self (e.g., Bodhi, 2005; Gethin, 2010).  As 
Buddhists often note, people experience a self 
inside them.  Not only does this self seem to be 
who they are, it is also the self who makes things 
happen, to whom things happen, who evaluates 
things, and so forth.  As Buddhists further note, this 
self is really just a cognitive construction that 
doesn’t exist anywhere other than in people’s 
minds.  Western scientists who study self often 
agree (e.g., Baumeister, 1998; Northoff et al., 
2006). 
According to Buddhism, this illusory sense of 
self constitutes the most central aspect of human 
conditioning, lying at the heart of people’s 
dissatisfaction and unhappiness.  It is the most 
basic root of samsara, ultimately responsible for the 
constant grasping and aversion that people exhibit 
over the course of daily activity.  Because people 
are so invested in promoting and protecting their 
sense of self, they constantly grasp at things that 
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they believe will promote it, and constantly avoid 
things they believe will harm it.  Every entity and 
event encountered becomes evaluated with respect 
to one’s self interests, with grasping and aversion 
being the outcomes of these evaluations. 
The constant sense of self that people 
experience can be viewed as resulting from IRs.  
Based on a life time of conditioning, people 
develop a huge amount of knowledge about who 
they believe they are, with aspects of this 
knowledge becoming active dynamically in a 
context-dependent manner when relevant (e.g., 
Markus & Wurf, 1987).  As people encounter 
entities and events, the conditioned IRs that result 
can include senses of self, thereby carrying 
information about one’s self interests in an implicit 
manner.  Not only do IRs represent an evaluation of 
an entity or event, they represent how it bears on 
one’s self interests.  These senses of self can reflect 
diverse sources of self-related information, 
including one’s goals, values, and traits, together 
with the in-groups to which one belongs and their 
associated norms (e.g., Baumeister, 1998; Frable, 
1997; Markus & Wurf, 1987). 
Much evidence in neuroscience demonstrates 
that a large distributed network along the cortical 
midline, from ventral and dorsal prefrontal areas to 
the posterior cingulate, becomes active to process 
self relevance (e.g., Northoff et al., 2006).  As 
people view a wide variety of self-relevant stimuli 
(e.g., traits, faces, scenes), this network becomes 
active to process them.  Interestingly, these same 
areas become active to process other individuals 
besides oneself, suggesting that processing the self-
related interests of others is not only important, but 
draws on the same general system that processes 
information about oneself.  Sui, Humphreys, and 
their colleagues have recently provided a large 
body of especially compelling evidence for the 
significant power of self relevance (e.g., Sui & 
Humphreys, 2015a, 2015b; Sui, Liu, Mevorach, & 
Humphreys, 2015; Sui, Rotshtein, & Humphreys, 
2013).  Simply associating a random shape with 
oneself, for example, makes the shape much more 
salient and relevant than usual.  Not only does the 
shape become more important conceptually, it 
becomes easier to process perceptually.  In 
summary, all of these neural and behavioral 
findings make it clear that self-related processing 
constitutes a central part of cognition, as Buddhist 
assumptions about the root causes of conditioning 
anticipate. 
Notably, however, Western science doesn’t view 
self-related processing with the same antipathy as 
does Buddhism.  To the contrary, self-related 
processing is often viewed much more positively in 
Western traditions, such that Western science is less 
oriented to examining how self-related processing 
produces dissatisfaction and unhappiness. Thus, an 
important issue for future research is reconciling this 
tension regarding the positive vs. negative effects of 
self. 
Destructive emotions.  As we have seen, 
bottom-up processing continually produces IRs to 
entities and events encountered during daily activity.  
Not surprisingly, the initial evaluations and self-
assessments in these IRs can lead to increasingly 
complex, powerful, and temporally-extended 
emotions.  As the implications of an important entity 
or event become clear, a strong emotional response is 
likely to signal this importance and to motivate 
relevant actions for some time thereafter.  Rather than 
simply experiencing the entity or event with 
equanimity and letting it pass, people often 
experience it with extended emotion that reflects self-
interested grasping and/or aversion, perpetuated 
through rumination.  Not only does such emotion 
throw people out of balance, it may also lead to 
actions that are dysfunctional or destructive.  When a 
friend disapproves of your clothing, for example, the 
self-interested aversion that results may produce 
anger, followed by a desire for revenge that leads to 
reciprocal disapproval. 
The construct of destructive emotion plays 
central roles in Buddhism, being contrasted with 
constructive emotion (e.g., Dreyfus, 2008; 
Goleman, 2003).  Destructive emotion is the 
natural consequence of self-interest, grasping, and 
aversion; it plays salient and central roles in the 
dissatisfaction and unhappiness that constitutes 
samsara; it can lead to destructive intentions and 
actions.  In Western science, the closely related 
constructed of neuroticism is typically associated 
with experiencing extensive amounts of negative 
emotion.  As much research shows, increasing 
neuroticism is strongly associated with increased 
health problems, increased social problems, 
decreased psychological well-being, and lower 
longevity (e.g., Lahey, 2009). 
Again, both Buddhism and Western science 
converge.  To the extent that destructive/negative 
emotion results from IRs to entities and events in 
the world, quality of life decreases.  Again, 
however, important differences exist.  Westerners, 
for example, view pride as a positive emotion that 
reflects a strong self, whereas Buddhists view it as 
a negative emotion that destroys equanimity (i.e., 
by grasping at the things that motivate feeling 
proud). 
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Mind wandering.  As IRs produce 
evaluations, self-related responses, and emotions, 
they can further launch thought into mental time 
travel, taking people out of the current moment as 
they imagine being in some other situation.  Rather 
than focusing on the task at hand, people become 
pre-occupied with their thoughts.  Seeing a friend, 
for example, might produce an IR related to their 
recent disapproval, which first causes reenactment 
of the previous situation, followed by planning 
further revenge in the near future.  In the process, 
awareness of the present situation fades, as has any 
equanimity that might have existed.  Instead, 
grasping and aversion at past and future events take 
over, motivated by self-interest. 
The dysfunctional roles of mind wandering 
have been noted widely both in contemplative 
traditions (e.g., Dreyfus, 2011; Dunne, 2011; 
Fronsdal, 2001; Kabat-Zinn, 1994) and in Western 
science (e.g., Hofmann, Baumeister, Förster, & 
Vohs, 2012; Kane & McVay, 2012; Killingsworth 
& Gilbert, 2010; Lutz, Jha, Dunne, & Saron, 2015; 
Mrazek et al., 2012).  Certainly mind wandering 
can be productive when people are planning future 
events, solving problems, and so forth (e.g., Baird, 
Smallwood, & Schooler, 2011; Gerlach, Spreng, 
Madore, & Schacter, 2014).  Nevertheless, mind 
wandering can also produce distractions that lead to 
performance errors in external tasks, 
psychopathology through rumination, and so forth.  
Regardless, mind wandering, at least to some 
extent, can again be viewed as the sequelae of IRs. 
Finally, the brain areas that produce mind 
wandering in the default mode network overlap 
extensively with the brain areas that process self-
relevance (e.g., Kucyi & Davis, 2014; Mittner et 
al., 2014; Qin & Northoff, 2011; Sheline et al., 
2009).  Such findings strongly suggest that mind 
wandering often focuses on self-related interests, 
consistent with self-absorption being the root cause 
of dissatisfaction and unhappiness in Buddhism. 
Exacerbating IRs with RRs.  At some point 
as an IR evolves from evaluation to mind 
wandering, regulatory processing may take over.  
As we will see in the next section, regulatory 
processing could attempt to down regulate an IR 
via inhibition, reappraisal, mindfulness, and so 
forth.  On some occasions, however, regulatory 
processing might instead exacerbate the problems 
that an IR initiates by up-regulating the evaluation, 
self-related processing, and emotion that occurs.  
When encountering an appetitive stimulus, such as 
a food or a drug, an initial IR might produce an 
approach tendency toward it.  Rather than down-
regulating the IR, however, a subsequent RR could 
up-regulate it into a full-blown craving, creating a 
temporally-extended obsession to consume the 
appetitive object (e.g., Kavanagh, Andrade, & May, 
2005).  In this manner, RRs have the potential to 
significantly increase the evaluations, self-
relevance, and emotion associated with processing 
an entity or event, thereby increasing the problems 
that regulatory processing in contemplative 
practices aims to address. 
RRs in Contemplative Practices 
Contemplative practices, such as Buddhism, 
typically recognize that they have a 10,000 pound 
gorilla on their hands, and then set out to do 
something about it.  As we have seen, Buddhism 
first analyzes the problem, focusing on the nature of 
the underlying causal system that produces the 
problematic behavior, emotion, and thought.  By 
understanding the problem, it becomes possible to 
formulate a solution that effectively targets the 
critical mechanisms.  In Buddhism, the solution can 
be viewed as an attempt to implement RRs that, 
first, manage problematic IRs and their root causes, 
and second, replace them with a causal system that 
produces healthier IRs. 
Consistent with dual-process theories, 
Buddhism implements short-term RRs that manage 
problematic IRs in the moment, together with long-
term RRs that produce significant long-term change 
in behavior, emotion, and thought (e.g., Stanovich 
et al., 2014).  Together, these RRs attempt to tame 
self-interest, grasping, aversion, destructive 
emotion, and mind wandering, and to replace them 
with a positive set of qualities, such as selflessness, 
kindness, generosity, and compassion.  Should a 
practitioner be successful, their experience of life 
shifts increasingly from samsara to equanimity and 
happiness. 
In the next subsections, we will consider 
various RRs in Buddhism that attempt to:  (1) 
manage problematic IRs in the moment 
(concentration and mindfulness practices), (2) 
replace problematic IRs with new IRs over the 
long-term (conduct practices), (3) fundamentally 
restructure one’s subjective experience of mind 
(wisdom practices).  Together, these three kinds of 
contemplative practices constitute the Eight-Fold 
Path in Buddhism, an impressive collection of 
regulatory strategies that aim to transform a 
person’s mindfulness, ethical conduct, and wisdom, 
respectively (e.g., Gethin, 2010).  From the dual-
process perspective, these contemplative practices 
establish a wide variety of RRs, some that manage 
IRs in the moment, and others that attempt long-
term change.   For a review of these three types of 
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contemplative practice from the perspective of 
Western science and clinical practice, see Dahl, 
Lutz, and Davidson (2015).  Here, the focus is on 
how the dual-process approach produces insight 
into these practices. 
Assembling RRs.  Initially, when a new 
contemplative practice is acquired (e.g., 
mindfulness, compassion), RRs are required to learn 
and implement it.  Because the practice hasn’t been 
encoded into IRs, it can’t yet run implicitly in the 
background, but instead requires deliberate control.  
With regular practice, however, IRs develop to 
implement the practice more implicitly, such that it 
increasingly runs in the background, without the use 
of regulatory resources. 
Importantly, however, people don’t learn 
contemplative practices completely from scratch.  
Instead, their cognitive systems already possess many 
of the basic abilities relevant to performing these 
strategies, such that initially learning a contemplative 
practice primarily involves assembling existing 
abilities into new RRs (e.g., Bishop et al., 2006; Lebois 
et al., 2015).  One source of evidence for this 
hypothesis is the finding that non-meditators can be 
taught simple beginning contemplative skills in as little 
as 10-15 minutes.  Specifically, participants can 
quickly begin to acquire concentration skills associated 
with mindfulness (e.g., Dickenson, Berkman, Arch, & 
Lieberman, 2013), as well as decentering skills (e.g., 
Lebois et al., 2015; Papies, Barsalou, & Custers, 2012; 
Papies et al., 2015; Tincher, Lebois, & Barsalou, 2015).  
Initial albeit superficial learning of these skills can 
occur quickly because they draw on existing cognitive 
processes, such as strategic attention and perspective 
shifting.  Thus, learning a contemplative practice is not 
a mysterious esoteric practice, but a natural and 
relatively transparent assembly of existing abilities, at 
least initially. 
No doubt, extensive practice that transforms 
RRs into IRs is essential for realizing the full 
potential of contemplative practices, or to even 
begin experiencing a significant fraction of their 
potential.  Furthermore, extensive practice is likely 
to create new cognitive skills that didn’t exist 
previously.  Nevertheless, early practice appears to 
build upon and benefit significantly from pre-
existing processing resources that can be assembled 
into new RRs. 
Concentration and mindfulness practices.  
A basic (often preliminary) contemplative practice 
on the Eight Fold Path simply involves improving 
the abilities to concentrate and be mindful.  One 
common technique is to practice holding attention 
on something continually, such as on the breath or 
an external object (e.g., Kornbloom, 2008; 
Salzberg, 2011).  Over time, properly performed 
practice increases the duration of how long 
concentration can be maintained.  Because 
concentrating on a variety of instructions, texts, 
mental states, and so forth is essential for properly 
performing later contemplative practices on the 
Eight-Fold Path, developing the ability to 
concentrate is an important first step.  For an 
account of the neural networks assembled to 
perform this practice, see Hasenkamp, Wilson-
Mendenhall, Duncan, and Barsalou (2012). 
As concentration strengthens, mindfulness 
typically increases (e.g., Kabat-Zinn, 1994; 
Kornbloom, 2008; Salzberg, 2011).  While attempting 
to concentrate on an object, attention invariably drifts 
away, as the practitioner’s mind wanders.  Learning 
to understand and handle mind wandering is arguably 
the crux of concentration and mindfulness practices.  
The first step in developing mindfulness is to realize 
that attention has wandered away from the focal 
object.  The second step is to recognize the nature of 
the distraction without evaluating it or reacting in 
some way (remaining non-evaluative and non-
reactive; Kabat-Zinn, 1994).  The third step is 
returning attention to the object of concentration.  For 
related but different forms of mindfulness practice, 
see Dreyfus (2011) and Dunne (2011, 2015). 
Together, the RRs assembled to implement 
concentration and mindfulness practices begin to 
disable problematic IRs.  By developing RRs that 
increase concentration, it becomes possible to 
simply observe IRs as they arise, such that they are 
less likely to control cognition, emotion, and action 
unconsciously.  As a result, the practitioner begins 
to better see the grasping, aversion, self-processing, 
and emotion that IRs produce.  By developing RRs 
that enforce non-evaluation and non-reactivity, the 
practitioner learns to experience IRs without 
evaluating and acting on them.  Rather than 
producing extended emotion and action, IRs simply 
arise and dissipate.  In this manner, mindfulness 
begins to break the karmic cycle.  Not engaging 
with an IR stops the normal process of perpetuating 
it as a habit and entrenching it further as a causal 
mechanism in a bottom-up pathway.  Instead, the 
IR becomes increasingly ineffective every time it is 
experienced mindfully, thereby decreasing it’s 
future likelihood of becoming active and affecting 
behavior, emotion, and thought. 
With increasing practice, mindfulness has the 
potential to alter a wide variety of IRs associated 
with grasping, aversion, and self-relevance.  To the 
extent that these IRs no longer govern mental 
experience, dissatisfaction with the current state of 
the world becomes less likely.  Once the world no 
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longer appears lacking in some way, increasingly 
extended states of equanimity follow, leading to 
happiness (e.g., Ricard, 2007). 
A frequent misunderstanding about 
mindfulness is that the equanimity it produces 
causes people to withdraw from the world.  To the 
contrary, mindfulness leads to freedom from the 
problematic IRs that normally control cognition, 
emotion, and action.  When problematic IRs no 
longer dominate consciousness, greater choice in 
how to act becomes possible.  Indeed, some 
mindfulness practices stress the importance of 
engaging in ethical evaluation of mind wandering 
states for the purpose of evaluating the character of 
one’s intentions and potential actions (e.g., 
Dreyfus, 2011; Dunne, 2011, 2015).  From this 
perspective, it is necessary to evaluate the ethical 
implications of one’s distracting thoughts for the 
purpose of personal growth.  Thus, mindfulness 
isn’t simply a tool for achieving the peace of 
equanimity—although that is certainly a benefit—it 
can also play central roles in making the 
practitioner a better person and a positive force in 
the world through wiser decisions and actions.  
Indeed, many Western mindfulness practitioners 
become increasingly engaged in addressing social 
problems (e.g., socially engaged Buddhism; King, 
2009). 
Finally, the dual-process perspective offers a 
potentially useful framework for understanding the 
regulatory processes that underlie concentration and 
mindfulness practices.  The large theoretical and 
empirical literatures associated with self-regulation 
offer explanatory systems for understanding how 
these practices are learned initially and begin to 
produce positive effects.  Specifically, these practices 
can be viewed as drawing heavily on classic attention 
mechanisms for focusing, shifting, disengagement, 
and vigilance (cf. Chun, Golomb, & Turk-Browne, 
2011; Thompson, Besner, & Smilek, 2015).  
Additionally, these practices draw heavily on the 
executive system and its ability to regulate cognition, 
emotion, and action through goal setting, plan 
execution, goal protection, inhibition, and so forth 
(e.g., Berger, 2011; Goschke, 2013; Hofmann, et al., 
2012; Mischel et al., 2011). 
Conduct practices.  As we just saw, 
developing concentration and mindfulness creates 
space for new attitudes, intentions, and behaviors to 
develop.  The second major set of practices on the 
Eight-Fold-Path—conduct practices—take 
advantage of this space, aiming to restructure the 
bottom-up pathways that initially control behavior, 
emotion, and thought through IRs.  As this 
restructuring occurs, it increasingly changes how 
the practitioner experiences the world and acts in it.  
As a consequence of performing conduct practices, 
the practitioner becomes less selfish, more oriented 
towards others, and more ethical.  Not only do 
these changes in perspective increase one’s social 
contributions, they also makes one happier (e.g., 
Dunne, 2015; Ricard, 2007).  Happiness cannot 
occur without these changes—equanimity is not 
enough. 
Lojong in Tibetan Buddhism constitutes one 
classic form of conduct practice, often referred to 
as mind training (e.g., Jinpa, 2006) .  The core 
material of Lojong is transmitted through a variety 
of texts that include slogans, aphorisms, and verse.  
As practitioners study and learn from these texts, 
they become acquainted with new attitudes and 
values, new ways of thinking about oneself, new 
ways of thinking about others, and new possibilities 
for acting in the world.  Once practitioners absorb 
these possibilities, they begin to develop intentions 
for implementing them in everyday experience, and 
to develop specific plans for executing them. 
Other Buddhist traditions change conduct 
through Metta practices (e.g., Kornbloom, 2008; 
Salzberg, 2011).  During these practices, meditators 
generate constructive emotions, such as loving 
kindness and compassion, towards a diverse 
collection other people, including individuals for 
whom they might normally experience intense 
negative emotion.  By generating these emotions 
towards others on a regular basis, practitioners 
establish these new mental habits in memory that 
change their perceptions of people and their actions 
toward them.   In important ways, Lojong and 
Metta practices are much like Cognitive Behavioral 
Therapies that aim to develop new knowledge 
structures, automatic responses, and behaviors 
(e.g., Beck & Dozois, 2011; Hayes, 2004). 
From the dual-process perspective, Lojong and 
Metta practices present guidelines, instructions, and 
examples to practitioners that implement long-term 
behavioral change via a wide variety of regulatory 
activities.  Initially, RRs absorb and implement the 
teachings.  Ultimately, however, these RRs establish 
new IRs that come to dominate thought, emotion, 
and action (as increasingly demonstrated by 
empirical research; e.g., Hofmann, Grossman, & 
Hinton, 2011).  Again, the dual-process perspective 
offers a useful framework for understanding the 
regulatory processes that initiate and eventually 
produce these long-term changes.  The large 
theoretical and empirical literatures on creating 
meaning, developing new narratives, and redirecting 
goals offer useful perspectives on how conduct 
practices operate (e.g., Pennebaker, 1997; Stanovich 
  9 
et al., 2014; Wilson, 2011).  Conversely, conduct 
practices are likely to offer new insights into similar 
Western interventions. 
To the extent that conduct practices are 
successful, they lead to positive social qualities such 
as the Brahmaviharas, which include loving kindness, 
compassion, sympathetic joy, and equanimity (e.g., 
Wallace, 1999).  Because conduct practices also 
diminish self-absorption, the related processes of 
destructive emotion and mind wandering become less 
likely, as do grasping and aversion.  As self-related 
thought become less prevalent, equanimity follows, 
as does becoming more present in the world.  When 
actions are performed, they are less likely to be self-
serving and more likely to serve the general good and 
the needs of others. 
Wisdom practices.  Once mindfulness, 
equanimity, and ethical conduct have been 
established, some of the more advanced Buddhist 
practices become possible (e.g., Namgyal, 2001; 
Norbu, 1983; Schmidt, 2004; Thrangu, 2004).  The 
aims of these practices include understanding the 
nature of mind and becoming increasingly liberated 
from samsara. 
Once the ability to focus attention has become 
free from mind wandering and other self-absorbed 
distractions, it is focused on conscious experience, 
both introspective and perceptual.  As various aspects 
of consciousness receive attention, they are examined 
to better understand their nature.  For example, each 
aspect of consciousness is assessed for whether it is 
real or simply a construction of the mind.  Ultimately, 
the goal is to see that every aspect of consciousness is 
an impermanent conditioned construction that arises 
and dissipates.  Although this is obvious for dreams 
and illusions, it is less obvious for thoughts and 
perceptions, which typically seem real.  Also targeted 
by this practice is the idea that perceived entities and 
events have essences, reflecting some kind of true 
nature in reality.  Again, the goal is to see that these 
essences don’t actually exist and are simply 
constructions of mind. 
Although all aspects of consciousness are 
examined in this manner, conscious experiences of 
the self and the external world are of particular 
importance.  To increasingly decrease the grasping 
and aversion associated with pursuing self-interest, 
wisdom practices help see the self as a conditioned 
construction, whose forms arise and dissipate in 
experience.  Once this realization occurs, the force 
of self on thought, emotion, and action decreases.  
Analogously, to understand the nature of 
perception, wisdom practices help see through the 
compelling (and important) illusion that perceived 
states exist externally (e.g., as in vision).  Instead, 
perceptions are internal constructions that don’t 
really exist outside the person as they appear, but 
belong to a general field of consciousness within 
the mind.  Once the true natures of self-perception 
and external perception are perceived, they no 
longer carry the significance they once did.  As 
their psychological natures become increasingly 
understood, they decreasingly initiate the constant 
grasping and aversion that underlie samsara. 
As wisdom practices make the nature of 
consciousness increasingly apparent, the normal 
dualism of experience increasingly dissipates into a 
non-dual state during contemplative practice (e.g., 
Dunne, 2015).  Rather than normally experiencing 
fundamental distinctions between the self and the 
external world, or of the self acting on objects, 
these distinctions increasingly collapse in 
consciousness.  Practitioners enter the natural state, 
where consciousness exists without a sense of a self 
evaluating and acting in an external world, without 
a sense of lack or imbalance (e.g., Namgyal, 2001; 
Norbu, 1983; Schmidt, 2004; Thrangu, 2004).  
Consciousness simply exists, less obscured by the 
conditioning that underlies samsara.  While in these 
states, a practitioner may still act, think, and feel 
emotion, as the causal structures established in 
conduct practices produce ethical conduct (e.g., 
Dunne, 2015).  There is much less sense, however, 
of a self acting, thinking, and feeling. 
Many practitioners may not perform practices 
aimed at producing non-dual states, or aspire to 
experience them.  Nevertheless wisdom practices stand 
as a testament to what’s possible with disciplined 
regulatory processing.  Once mindfulness and conduct 
practices diminish problems associated with IRs, 
wisdom practices focus on understanding the nature of 
mind, further dissolving the illusions that contribute to 
samsara.  By developing RRs that examine the nature 
of consciousness, it becomes possible to attain critical 
insights about how the mind works. 
RRs developed during wisdom practices 
complement other RRs developed during earlier 
practices along the Eight-Fold Path.  Together, all these 
RRs constitute an extensive regulatory system that not 
only regulates experience in the moment, but that 
changes behavior, emotion, and thought in the long 
term, with newly created IRs fundamentally changing 
how a person thinks, feels, and acts.  From the dual-
process perspective, this regulatory system has tamed 
the 10,000 pound gorilla responsible for the constant 
barrage of dysfunctional IRs that underlie samsara. 
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Discussion 
We began with the observation that dual-
process theories have been applied extensively to 
cognitive and social phenomena for over 100 years.  
This chapter has similarly attempted to apply dual-
process theories to contemplative practices that 
have existed for thousands of years in Buddhism.  
As we have seen, a striking rapport exists between 
them. 
Most basically, the two kinds of processes central 
in dual-process theories—IRs and RRs—are readily 
apparent throughout Buddhism.  On the one hand, IRs 
underlie the dissatisfaction and unhappiness that 
Buddhism aims to address, produced by the root causes 
of self-illusion, grasping, and aversion.  On the other 
hand, an impressive system of RRs constituting the 
Eight-Fold Path offers a means of transforming 
dissatisfaction and unhappiness, creating healthier IRs 
in the process.  Because dual-process theories map so 
well onto Buddhism, the large bodies of theory and 
research associated with these theories can be brought 
to bear on informing its basic principles, such as The 
Four Noble Truths, karma, samsara, and mindfulness. 
Conversely, Buddhism offers considerable potential 
for better understanding dual-process theories.  As we 
saw earlier, the root causes of samsara—grasping, 
aversion, and self-relevance—provide insights into the 
causes of the unhappiness, psychopathology, and other 
dysfunctional aspects of the human condition.  Similarly, 
the integrated approach of the Eight-Fold Path, together 
with its individual practices, offers ideas for regulatory 
interventions that could be adapted effectively in 
Western contexts, and that already have been to a 
considerable extent (e.g., mindfulness and compassion 
practices).  An intriguing possibility is that integrated 
collections of interventions could be developed in the 
Western tradition that are analogous to the Eight Fold 
Path in Buddhism. 
Perhaps the most to be gained will result from 
integrating the two approaches in areas where doing 
so is relevant.  When developing social and clinical 
interventions that have a contemplative character, 
for example, drawing on both explanatory 
frameworks and integrating their relevant insights 
may offer the greatest opportunity for success.  
Whereas the Western framework excels at working 
with unconscious cognitive and neural mechanisms, 
the Buddhist framework excels at working with 
conscious experience and daily practice.  Although 
both have converged on remarkably similar 
accounts of mind in many ways (as reflected in the 
common importance of IRs and RRs), they 
nevertheless offer complementary accounts of the 
same phenomena, each providing unique insights. 
As researchers work increasingly with both 
frameworks together, a likely outcome is that each 
explanatory framework will have significant 
influence on the other, such that hybrids emerge.  
Based on what we have seen, much potential for 
mutual influence exists, first, in understanding the 
causal systems of IRs that dominate behavior, 
emotion, and thought, and second, in developing 
sophisticated systems of RRs that manage IRs in 
the moment and change them in the long term. 
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Footnotes 
 
1  So that the acronyms to follow will be easily 
decodable, I only use IR for Initial Responses 
and RR for Regulatory Responses (instead of 
IIR for Involuntary Initial Responses and ORR 
for Optional Regulatory Responses).  
Nevertheless, the assumption remains that 
initial responses tend to be involuntary, 
reflecting the bottom-up activation of modality-
specific pathways, whereas regulatory 
responses tend to optional, primarily occurring 
when sufficient motivation, capacity, and 
knowledge exist. 
2  Although I focus on the bottom-up activation of 
IRs here, it is essential to note that these 
activations operate in the context of extensive 
top-down processing (e.g., Barsalou, 2009, in 
press; Clark, 2013; Friston, 2010; McClelland 
& Rumelhart, 1981).  Background processing 
typically produces top-down predictions about 
objects and events likely to be encountered in 
the current situation, together with extensive 
top-down inferences about them once they 
occur. 
